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Migrants are no longer cut off from their roots. Maintaining familial, political,
cultural, and economic linkages with native lands is easier and is indeed encouraged
by nations' acceptance of multicultural identities and the promotion of global
economic opportunities.
A third focus of the volume compares the great migrations of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries with the smaller migrations that have occurred in the
last three decades of the twentieth century. Although Wang primarily focuses on the
Chinese who migrated to Southeast Asia, his musings on the subject in general
establish important points of comparison for other scholars to consider. Most
differences in experience stem from host-country policies relating to immigration,
intermarriage, trading, and settlement; the political and economic conditions of
China; the complexities of maintaining and recasting Chinese identity and culture in
non-Chinese societies; and the strategies Chinese migrants have developed in order to
build communities, families, and institutions abroad. The greater diversity of Chinese
migrants in the latter half of the twentieth century is also a significant factor
distinguishing the Chinese diaspora. Although the vast majority of nineteenth- and
early-twentieth-century Chinese migrant came from the coastal regions of South
China, today's migrants come not only from all regions of mainland China but also
from Hong Kong and Taiwan, as well as from Southeast Asia and other countries. In
the last article of the volume, Wang argues that such comparisons of people and
communities across time and space mark an important next step in the future of
overseas Chinese studies.
As is the case in many collections of previously published essays, some chapters
in Don't Leave Home appear out of context, especially those that were written as
introductions to other edited anthologies. Material in one essay is also often repeated
in later essays. The book offers only a very short preface and is in dire need of a long,
thoughtful introduction that brings together disparate themes, explains the contexts
in which the pieces were written, and gives further shape to the field of scholarship
that Wang has been so instrumental in building.
The first in a four-book collection, Don't Leave Home is designed as an introduction
to the field of Chinese diaspora studies by one of its premier architects. Despite the
minor criticisms above, it is an essential guide for students and scholars alike. The
three forthcoming volumes planned for the collection will focus on themes ranging
from Chinese relations with the Malay world to Chinese civilization and nationalism
in the Asia Pacific, and promise to be just as valuable.
ERIKA LEE
University of Minnesota
Hong Kong, Empire, and the Anglo-American Alliance at War, 1941-1945. By
A N D R E W W H I T F I E L D . New York: Palgrave, 2001. 266 pp. $65.00 (cloth).
Andrew Whitfield has written an interesting study of the Hong Kong question
during the Pacific War. His work is a useful addition to the growing list of studies
on Anglo-American relations during and after the Second World War. For a long
time, experts in diplomatic history in the United States tended to dismiss the
significance of the Anglo-American conflict in the Far East. Their studies focused
narrowly on the role of the United States and often demonstrated no familiarity or
interest in the ideas, behavior, and policies of America's most important ally during
the period, Great Britain. William Roger Louis and Christopher Thorne were, of
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course, the few exceptions. Robert Skidelsky's last volume of John Maynard Keynes's
biography offered a critical support for the thesis shared by many Anglo-American
historians, including this reviewer, that the so-called Anglo-American special
relationship was more fictional than real during the 1940s. The conflicting interests
between the two sides had not only created difficulties for allied policies but had also
established the dynamics for debates, negotiations, and compromises that had
contributed a great deal to the shaping of the postwar world. The typical American
parochialism represented by authors such as Warren I. Cohen and Nancy B. Tucker
can no longer be taken seriously.
Based mainly on original sources, Whitfield places the issue of Hong Kong in a
broad perspective, not just in diplomacy but also in economics and geopolitics in the
Asia-Pacific region. The pertinence of his analysis is particularly evident when he
stresses the broad internal consensus over the question of Hong Kong, which was by
no means a simple question of regaining a lost colony, but one that affected the
survival of the British Empire after its humiliating collapse in Asia since the fall of
Hong Kong in 1941. Whitfield rightly argues that the firm British stand on Hong
Kong derived from an "imperial consensus" (p. 16), and the success of such stand was
attributed to the incompetence of Chiang Kai-shek (pp. 198—203). Despite the fact
that Chiang had received American support, morally at least, the Chinese nationalist
leader handled the Hong Kong question in a clumsy way.
The British government had plans for Hong Kong during 1943—44. According
to the author, the prevailing view in London during this period was that the
Americans and the Chinese were colluding to "see British interest removed from Asia"
(p. 107). The Colonial Office established a Hong Kong Planning Unit (HKPU) in
August 1943. The basic operational assumption was to prevent Hong Kong from
slipping away at the end of the war. Since Hong Kong was deliberately excluded from
the Southeast Asian Command (SEAC) directed by Lord Mountbatten, anxieties grew
as the war was drawing to a close. The Colonial Office finally overcame the lack of
enthusiasm in the Foreign Office to compel the war cabinet to define the Hong Kong
question unequivocably. After considerable bickering in Whitehall, the green light
was at last given in November 1944, which took the form of Labour leader and Deputy
Prime Minister Attlee's parliamentary statement: Hong Kong remains in the British
Empire.
The summit diplomacy during the war, according to the author, also reflected
the deep disagreement between London and Washington concerning China and Hong
Kong. At the Cairo Conference, in particular, the British were frustrated with
President Roosevelt when the presumed agenda about the details of "Overlord" was
overtaken by the Chinese delegation led by Chiang Kai-shek. The subsequent
conferences in Tehran and Yalta further confirmed the British suspicion that America
had a different agenda about China, which was in direct confrontation with that of
Britain. Fortunately, Roosevelt's China policy was never articulated in a way that the
seeming contradictions could be explained adequately. Chiang Kai-shek, on his part,
had little grasp of great power politics and diplomacy. Chiang's position was also
severely damaged by his inability to control domestic unrest.
More importantly, as the war came to an end, Soviet power grew rapidly. The
American government began to see the Hong Kong question increasingly from a
global, rather than regional, perspective. Hence, the pressure on Britain to retrocede
Hong Kong was alleviated. The secret agreement with the Soviet Union at Yalta,
which allowed Stalin to control Port Arthur in Manchuria, also fatally undermined
Roosevelt's Hong Kong policy. There appeared no strong argument for Washington
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to oppose Britain's regaining the port of Hong Kong. Under the circumstances,
despite the much weakened position at the end of the war, Britain was able to carry
out its planned Hong Kong policy and repel challenges from different quarters.
While Whitfield's book is convincing and well informed, I have a few quibbles
with his analysis. First and foremost, I doubt his statement that the Anglo-American
special relations worked well in the Western front, for "there were few British interests
in dispute" (p. 3). D. C. Watt's Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place, 1900-
1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) and Robert Skidelsky's John
Maynard Keynes: A Biography (3 vols. London: MacMillan, 1983, 1992, 2000) both
amply demonstrated that the dispute between London and Washington was
particularly fierce in the West, although their conflict in the Far East was more open
and emotional. It is true that the clashes over empires were chiefly played out in Asia,
but the underlying reasons for these clashes were deeply rooted in their different views
of the postwar world in general. Second, I am not sure about Whitfield's assertion
that "it is misleading to maintain that Churchill was instrumental in forcing Britain's
return to Hong Kong" (p. 214). Evidence seems to suggest that Churchill was more
than instrumental in this matter and in other issues related to the return of the
colonies.
Last but not least, it is not clear what conditions in China in \9A^>-AA led to
what the author claimed as "the collapse into virtual civil war, taking with it America's
China policy." The author made an important statement that such internal conditions
in China "reinstated the power vacuum which was the basis of Hong Kong's existence
as a British colony" (p. 124). But, his discussion about China's internal situation is
very weak.
All in all, Whitfield, a British analyst working at the Defense Ministry, has
produced a good study, which proves once again that, despite American writers'
obsession with Dean Acheson or other American policymakers, we still have a lot to
say about Anthony Eden or Ernest Bevin. The full picture of the Pacific War and the
origins of the cold war can never be complete without the story from the British side.
LANXIN X I A N G
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva
Remaking Chinese America: Immigration, Family, and Community, 1940—1965.
By XiAOjlAN Z H A O . New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2002.
256 pp. $59-00 (cloth); $22.00 (paper).
Xiaojian Zhao's book is an important contribution to a full understanding of the
Chinese American experience. The book focuses on three important elements of the
experience. They are the process of immigration, family formation, and the
transformation of the community. In describing the process of immigration, Zhao
shows the persistent struggle put up by Chinese to bring family members into the
United States and the important role women played in coaching sons and paper sons
to facilitate their entry. In writing about family formation, Zhao reveals the essential
role played by women in China in supporting the transpacific family and how Chinese
women utilized the War Brides Act to enter the United States for family unification.
In detailing community transformation, Zhao demonstrates how World War II and
cold war politics, the presence of women, and the influence of the Chinese American
press led to the breakdown of the traditional Chinatown power structure.
Zhao's book is among the recent scholarly works that have treated Chinese
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